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SUMMARY
In 2014 Decree 14/018 laying down the rules for granting forest concessions to local communities, followed by Ministerial Order 0/25 on the 
same issue, was published in the DRC. This paper aims to analyse the abovementioned legislation with respect to participatory management 
of forests. The explicit recognition of the duality of a customary de facto local community forest and a modern legal entity (concession) is an 
innovation. However, viewed from the perspective of the long-established habits within the country, the question remains whether these legal 
measures can be sufficient for ensuring the sustainable development of these community-held forested areas. Allowing community concessions 
up to 50,000 ha demonstrated a shift in the government policy away from the industrial timber cultivation model. However, an area this size is 
much larger than the communities can monitor, particularly in the case of artisanal charcoal or wood exploitation.
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Vers un modèle original de concessions communautaires en RDC
C. VERMEULEN et A. KARSENTY
En 2014, le décret 14/018, suivi par l’arrêté ministériel 0/25, ont établi les règles pour l’allocation de concessions aux communautés locales. 
Cet article vise à analyser ce cadre réglementaire au regard de la gestion participative des forêts. La reconnaissance explicite de la dualité entre 
une réalité coutumière de fait – la forêt des communautés locales – et une entité légale nouvelle – la concession communautaire – constitue une 
innovation. Cependant, au regard des habitudes enracinées dans la gouvernance locale, on peut se demander si de telles mesures seront 
suffisantes pour permettre un développement durable de ces espaces communautaires. Permettre aux concessions communautaires de s’étendre 
jusqu’à 50.000 hectares montre une inflexion de la politique gouvernementale en défaveur de la foresterie industrielle. De telles surfaces 
dépassent la capacité de supervision des communautés, particulièrement pour l’exploitation artisanale du bois d’œuvre et le charbon de bois. 
Hacia un modelo de concesiones basado en la comunidad en la RDC
C. VERMEULEN y A. KARSENTY
En 2014 se publicó en la RDC el Decreto 14/018, que establece la normativa para el otorgamiento de concesiones forestales a las comunidades 
locales, seguido en el mismo boletín oficial por la Orden Ministerial 0/25. El objetivo de este artículo es analizar los dos instrumentos regula-
torios mencionados con respecto a la gestión participativa de los bosques. El reconocimiento explícito de la dualidad de un bosque comuni-
tario local de facto basado en las costumbres y una entidad legal moderna (concesión) basada en prácticas consuetudinarias, es una innovación. 
Sin embargo, visto desde la perspectiva de las tradiciones establecidas desde antaño, la cuestión sigue siendo si estas medidas legales pueden 
ser suficientes. Otros factores interesantes son la demarcación participativa, la descentralización y la silvicultura social orientada hacia métodos 
de valoración que consumen pocos o ningún recurso, como el pago por conservación y el ecoturismo. El permitir concesiones comunitarias 
de hasta 50 000 hectáreas ha demostrado un cambio en las políticas del gobierno, que se alejan del modelo de cultivo de madera para usos 
industriales. Sin embargo, un área de este tamaño es mucho mayor de lo que las comunidades pueden monitorear, en particular en el caso del 
carbón artesanal o la explotación de madera.
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of community-based forestry, namely, participatory forest 
management. More recently the decree was followed by the 
Ministerial Order 0/25 on the same topic. Consequently, 
the DRC joined the other countries of the Congo Basin in 
recognising local communities, along with the state and the 
industrial operators, as active partners in forest management. 
This decree is considered a breakthrough, as Article 22 of the 
2002 Forest Code had already established the practice of 
community-based forestry, but the implementing legislation 
had not been adopted. 
The present study aims to analyse this legislation promul-
gated by the DRC government regarding the participatory 
management of forests and natural resources in the country.
A CONCESSION-HOLDER MODEL FOR THE PEOPLE
It is important to note that the term ‘’concession’’ is used in 
the DRC Forest Code. According to article 53 of the DRC 
Land Law, land is the exclusive, inalienable, and imprescrip-
tible property of the state. The Forest Code reasserts that 
forests are the property of the state; therefore, concessions 
for land or forests represent the only legal channel of access 
to land and resources in the DRC. Article 22 is the main 
innovation of the Forest Code, since it states that “A local 
community may, on request, obtain as forest concession, a 
part or the whole of the protected forests among those held 
under customary law”5. This Article has recognised the dis-
tinction between de facto holding and ownership. Moreover, 
it has paved the way for an interesting concept combining a 
modern category (the concession) and a customary practice 
(the terroir, that is the customary territory, as mentioned in 
Art. 1, para 17 of the Forest Code). This distinction is absent, 
for example, from legislation on community forests in 
Cameroon. 
Another interesting point is that the decree has made 
a clear difference between a local community forest and a 
concession. Article 18 of the decree states, “The area of a 
Local Community Forest is based on the extent of traditional 
possession” (without a predefined upper limit), whereas the 
limit of a forest concession granted to a local community (one 
or more concession holders) is 50,000 hectares. The implica-
tions of this much higher area limit than the 5,000 hectares 
applicable to community forests in Cameroon will be 
discussed later.
The third notable point is the irrevocable nature of the com-
munity forest, once the concession has been granted. Article 
15 of the decree alludes to the granting of a “perpetual’’ forest 
1
 If we consider the net annual deforestation rate (by taking into account planting and natural regeneration), these figures drop to 0.11 and 
0.22%, respectively.
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 See http://www.globalforestwatch.org/ 
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 In January 2016 the newly appointed minister announced his intention to begin allocating concessions again as soon as possible in order to 
generate more forestry revenues.
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 Available particularly at http://cd.chm-cbd.net/implementation/gestion-foresiere/decret-concessions-forestieres-communautes-locales-1-.pdf
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 French original text: ‘Une communauté locale peut, à sa demande, obtenir à titre de concession forestière une partie ou la totalité des forêts 
protégées parmi les forêts régulièrement possédées en vertu de la coutume’
INTRODUCTION: A FORESTRY SECTOR IN 
TRANSFORMATION
The forests of the Demo cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
cover an area of 155 million hectares, of which 99 million 
hectares are rain forests. The total forested area represents 
67% of the national territory. According to the State of the 
Forests 2010 report, the average annual rate of deforestation 
of the rainforests has increased from 0.15% (gross rate) 
during the 1990–2000 period to 0.32% during the 2005–2010 
period.1 Recent estimates of Global Forest Watch suggest a 
further increase in deforestation, with nearly 2 million hect-
ares of tree cover being lost in two years, 2013 and 20142. The 
leading causes of deforestation are small-scale (peasant) 
farming and the gathering of firewood (Defourny et al. 2011, 
Gillet et al. in press). Industrial concessions cover approxi-
mately 12 million hectares of forest in the DRC. However, 
these forests are not particularly productive, as, on average, 
only 2–4 m3 of timber is extracted per hectare. This low 
production rate is ascribed mainly to the exorbitant cost of 
transport. The annual volume of timber produced by these 
industrial concession areas is approximately 300,000 m3, 
which is quite low given the theoretical potential and 
compared with that of other Central African countries. For 
example, the average production by industrial forestry in 
Cameroon is 2.2 million m3. The artisanal sector in DRC 
mobilises much more wood than the industrial sector does, 
with over one million m3 of sawn volume produced annually, 
corresponding to 3.4 million m3 roundwood equivalent (RWE) 
(Lescuyer et al. 2014). The total production and consumption 
of wood is estimated 34 million m³ in RWE (Lee and Hubert 
2016). A part of the industrial production and, especially, the 
artisanal production is exported, often illegally, to the neigh-
bouring countries to the east of the DRC. Currently, a mora-
torium still prohibits any new forest industrial concessions 
being granted in the DRC until some key policy measures 
regarding the allocation of concessions are adopted (Debroux 
et al. 2007)3.
CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNITY 
FORESTS
The long awaited Decree 14/018 “fixant les modalités 
d’attribution des concessions forestières aux communautés 
locales” (that we can translate by “Laying down the rules 
for granting forest concessions to local communities”) was 
signed in 2014. This important decree4 has ushered in a form 
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concession to the local community, which means no predeter-
mined period to request a renewal has been determined. 
Community concessions are therefore likely to be formally 
irrevocable, even if the authorisation to harvest timber and 
other resources might not be granted or renewed because the 
management rules in compliance with the regulations were 
not being observed. Such potential irrevocability would be a 
de facto recognition of strong collective property rights to 
lands used, in spite of the current affirmation in the Forest 
Code that forests belong to the state.
THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY, KINSHIP AND 
CUSTOM
According to Article 2 of the decree, a local community is 
defined as “a population traditionally organised on the basis 
of custom and united by bonds of solidarity in a clan or a kin, 
underpinning its internal cohesion. It is further characterised 
by its attachment to a particular land”. The triad of the 
community, the links of kinship, and the land represents 
strong guarantees that, in theory, should permit only the local 
populations, in the strict sense of the term, to apply for a 
concession. This implies that any NGO, administration, or 
association that represents only a part of the community is 
excluded. However, Lescuyer et al. (2015) noted that the 
forestry ministry would like to see also concessions promoted 
by decentralised territorial entities, an option theoretically not 
allowed by the forest law. It is also worth noting that the law 
does not mention the administrative village in its definitions 
of “a community”. In this respect, the DRC is different from 
Cameroon or Gabon that base the community forest request 
only on the resident entity recognised by the state, knowingly 
ignoring the clan or lineage dimension. An original feature of 
the DRC, which describes challenges associated with some of 
its innovations, is that the links of clan or kinship often extend 
far beyond the strict confines of the village. Consequently, 
numerous beneficiaries from several places of residence could 
emerge for a given land area, as was highlighted by Vundu dia 
Massamba and Kalambay Lumpungu (2013). The place of 
traditional leaders in this model is also well portrayed. The 
decree seeks to prevent a “capture by the elites” by stating 
“The forest concession of the local community shall remain 
an indivisible asset of the local community as a whole, [the 
forest] does not belong to any association or to any corpora-
tion, let alone to the representative(s) of the community [. . .]”. 
The ministerial order confirms that the community assembly 
shall be the governing body of the concession. The intent 
of the legislation could not be clearer. However, taking into 
account the power and standing of the traditional leaders in 
the DRC, this intention could become undermined in practice 
by culture and the power of these community leaders.
The decree and order confirm some traditional powers, 
which is a noticeable development in relation to other legisla-
tion on community forestry in the sub-region. This strong 
traditional character has advantages but there are also con-
cerns, for instance, about the presence and voice of migrant 
populations. Migrants are present in numerous villages in the 
DRC and their numbers sometimes exceed those of the origi-
nal landowners. Although these migrants have often lived in 
the villages for decades, they are not entitled to the traditional 
rights to lands and resources. The question, therefore, is what 
would happen if these migrant populations, who are consum-
ers of resources on a par with the traditional rights holders, 
were to be excluded from the concession-related management 
processes and profit-sharing merely because of custom. 
Analyses pertaining to space resource management have indi-
cated that such exclusion often leads to predatory behaviour, 
especially as regards migrant populations (see, in particular, 
Laurent and Mathieu 1994). 
THE GENDER ISSUE
Gender is another concern in relation to the emphasis on 
tradition. Although the leaders of the clans and lineages or the 
public figures in these patriarchal societies are mostly men, 
women represent significant percentage of the users of the 
forest ecosystem. The problem is how to ensure that their 
opinions and interests are given due consideration in such 
an environment. The Cameroonian legislation pertaining to 
community forestry does not mention traditional structures 
and a priori grants women a more prominent role. It has been 
shown (Tobith and Cuny 2006) that women in Cameroon are 
involved at the initial stages, such as meetings and the prepa-
ration of simple forest management plans. However, women 
are not sufficiently represented during the decision-making 
phases, such as the constitution of the legal entity, allocation 
of the forest, or the submission of dossiers to the administra-
tion. Moreover, the management and benefits-sharing process 
often exclude women (Bouki 2016). It is feared, therefore, 
that the model based on traditions and cultural entities (clans, 
lineages, families, and the like) proposed for the DRC would 
largely marginalise women. The provisions of Ministerial 
Order 025 on the participation of “all groups” in the commu-
nity assembly or in the management committee are not 
sufficient to overcome the gender issue. 
RECOGNISING DUAL PRACTICE-A SIGNIFIANT STEP
In contrast with the legislation of Cameroon or Gabon, which 
overlooks the dual dimension of community forestry, the 
DRC Decree no. 14/018 specifically recognises community 
forestry and its dual character.
The decree differentiates between:
– A customary practice (‘local community forests’, 
equivalent to landholding) which corresponds to a de 
facto relationship and does not require institutionalisa-
tion, but could benefit from policy recognition, con-
verted into management principles, by participatory 
mapping;
– An institutional innovation (community concession) 
that derives from a customary practice but is distinct 
from it.
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‘Local community forests’ can extend over large areas, do 
not necessarily have precisely defined boundaries, could 
comprise (depending on the use of the resources specific 
to different communities) a scattered network of trails and 
places of activity, and constitute a space that can overlap — or 
be superimposed on — legal categories, such as industrial 
concessions or protected areas. Since local community forests 
are a matter of fact, there is no reason to confine or restrict 
their area by a regulatory instrument. As a customary practice, 
these forests should continue to be governed by the traditions 
prevailing in the relevant communities, and the regulations 
should therefore not impose a governance structure on them. 
Participatory mapping could facilitate the obtainment of 
social and political recognition for the practice of community 
forestry. The resulting maps could form the basis of contrac-
tual agreements (e.g., between an industrial concession 
holder and the community) on managing the overlaps 
between the customary forest and the industrial concession. 
In Gabon, these community forests are designated as village 
landholdings6 and are sometimes used for establishing an 
economic partnership between the farmers and the communi-
ties (money is allocated to community development by the 
concession holders in proportion to the overlapping of the 
landholding and the concession granted by the state to 
the operator). 
The community concession is a separate entity to which 
communities have exclusive rights, mainly for the production 
of timber and other natural resources. The decree states that 
the “concessions will be clear of all rights”. Therefore, no 
overlapping of industrial concessions with this category is 
allowed, as this category pertains to a de facto, as well as 
a legal relationship. Even though the category derives from 
customary practice, the difference is, as stipulated in the 
decree, that the members of its management bodies will be 
accountable to the whole community. Appointing the senior 
management by election appears to be the most suitable form 
to ensure accountability corresponding to the management 
responsibilities. 
However, it has to be noted that the arbitration process 
set out in the legislation does not provide for a reservation 
process that would benefit the people, as it has been done in 
Gabon. The law embodies a midway policy currently in force 
in some Congo Basin countries, where in recent regulations 
there is increasing recognition of local land rights which 
impinge on industrial concessions, often indirectly such as in 
Gabon (the Order refers explicitly to customary landholdings 
called “finages”) and Congo Brazzaville (with areas of 
communitarian development). But this recognition does not 
go as far as to prevent new concession allocations in case of 
local opposition, and even less to challenge the existence 
of the current ones. This is why policy proposals designed 
to recognise and manage overlapping rights on existing indus-
trial concessions seem best adapted to the mentality and 
to Congo Basin policymakers’ mindsets (see Karsenty and 
Vermeulen 2016).
A PARTICIPATORY APPROACH?
Article 4 of the decree provides for the applicant community 
to submit a “map prepared in a participatory manner in 
collaboration with neighbouring communities and other 
stakeholders”. Whereas the presence of neighbouring com-
munities is welcomed, guaranteeing an adversarial demarca-
tion process, the provision does not specify the identity of 
these stakeholders. The interests of numerous parties should 
be considered during the consultative process to establish 
large concession areas; however, a restrictive list could also 
be useful. The reason for this is that the mobilisation of these 
actors could be costly for the local community, as has been 
demonstrated by the experience in Cameroon (Julve et al. 
2007). It is also noteworthy that the decree does not prescribe 
the use of a geographic information system (GIS) or a global 
positioning system (GPS), a scale, or even a background 
map. Therefore, the communities are spared the expense of 
hiring consultants. In Gabon, simple management plans, 
using the most basic technical concepts possible and without 
any accurate background maps have been tested (Schippers 
et al. 2008). The disadvantage of this simplistic approach is 
that it deprives people of a strong technical base for further 
negotiations with the state and other partners (especially as 
regards the possible first-refusal for future concessions by 
local communities, given the presence of other players). 
As regards participatory management, Ministerial Order 
025 calls for the establishment of four structures: a commu-
nity assembly, a management committee, a local control 
committee, and a council of elders. The implicit hierarchy 
displayed in this list seems to call for an appropriate participa-
tory approaches and resolution of conflicts. However, it is 
feared, here again, that the groups generally excluded from 
traditional power, such as women, youth, migrants, poor 
people, etc. would not be empowered. Experience in the ini-
tial community forests of Gabon has shown that youth, were 
marginalised more often than the other groups, (Boldrini et al. 
2014) and this situation could also occur in the DRC. More-
over, the proliferation of decision-making and intermediation 
structures (four for a community in DRC) is not a guarantee 
of success, as these structures can enter into competition: 
studies in Cameroon showed that external structures of 
governance imposed on local communities are a source of 
conflict (Ezzine De Blas et al. 2011, Bouki 2016).
A DECENTRALISED PROCESS
The decentralised character of the decree is another original 
feature. Unlike countries such as Gabon or Cameroon, where 
the allocation decision is vested in a centralised supervisory 
authority and has to be signed by the minister of forests, 
the DRC process is devolved to the provincial level and is, 
therefore, largely in the hands of local authorities, with the 
6
 In French: “finages”
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allocation and signature rights vested in the governor. This 
situation is expected to lead to healthy competition between 
the provinces in the granting of these concessions. But it can 
be also be an obstacle for their allocation if the local govern-
ment is unfavourable to such an evolution, or is favouring 
other land-use vested interests. 
CONCESSIONS WITH EXCESSIVE AREAS?
Large forest concessions reserved for local communities exist 
in Latin America, but the institutional arrangements and, 
consequently, the collective action, apparently, are not the 
same throughout the world. Robinson et al. (2011) conducted 
a meta-analysis of the “forest outcomes” of land tenure 
arrangements, and noticed contrasting results between 
Central America (with, globally, rather positive outcomes), 
South America (mitigated results) and Africa. They especially 
noticed an “association between negative forest outcomes and 
communal land in Africa”. This suggests that tenure is only 
one factor among many others (local traditions and history, 
way of life, economic systems, governance context, etc.) that 
shapes the outcome of a given tenure system, a point too often 
overlooked. 
Article 18 of the DRC decree stipulates that the size of the 
concession is to be determined by the local community, based 
on the traditional land practices (not limited by area), with 
a ceiling of 50,000 ha. This maximum size may appear 
huge, since neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, limit 
community forests to a maximum of 5,000 ha. 
There are probably contradictory views on the conse-
quences of granting such large concession areas. One 
consideration pertains to wildlife management, which, in the 
neighbouring countries, had become almost irrelevant with 
the small-size surfaces allowed (because of the need for hunt-
ing and the home ranges of the main species). The concept of 
ecotourism is mentioned in Article 20 of the decree, and the 
concept of nature conservation in article 65 of order 025, 
opening the possibility to concessions managed for non-
consumptive use, such as observation (non-hunting) safaris, 
ecotourism excursions, and others. 
In addition to conservation, the decree provides for 
artisanal exploitation exclusively in these community conces-
sions, i.e., it expressly precludes industrial operators. How-
ever, it is doubtful the communities will have the capacity for 
the self-management and monitoring of an area as large as 
50,000 hectares. In the DRC, the central and provincial 
governments have a limited ability to control what occurs in 
areas far away from the large urban centres; this brings up 
the question of how such large areas would and should be 
managed. Three illegal channels of amassing wealth could 
arise quickly, namely: 
• The proliferation of contracts with artisanal operators 
(even if the Ministry Order 025 tries to organise this 
kind of exploitation) without the possibility of exercis-
ing control over their activities. In fact, this aspect 
relates to both a source of degradation of the forest 
ecosystem and an informal sector struggling to secure 
the appropriate licenses for its activities (Lescuyer 
et al. 2014). Therefore, the risk that these actors, 
including some (similar to some industrial players) 
who might have predatory intentions, could become 
involved in local community concessions has to be 
taken into account and, if possible, managed; 
• Illegal subcontracts with industrial operators (despite 
the fact that Ministry Order 025 prohibits it), who 
could exploit the community concessions, without any 
control being possible. 
• Illegal charcoal exploitation, (despite the fact that 
Ministry Order 025 tries to organise this kind of 
exploitation).
Obviously, these risks exist regardless of the size of the 
concessions granted to the communities, but they increase 
along with the size of the areas involved. This factor could 
constitute an additional obstacle in verifying the volume of 
legal timber, i.e., that respects the Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) process.
CONCESSION OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND THE 
FLEGT PROCESS
In a global context, where the environment is of main 
concern, the European Union (EU) has launched the FLEGT 
programme for timber and timber products7. This action plan 
was published in 2003 as the EU’s response to illegal logging 
(European Commission and Cameroon 2010), which causes 
significant environmental and social damage. The FLEGT 
programme includes various measures, including the promo-
tion of the legal timber trade by developing Voluntary Partner-
ship Agreements (VPAs), as well as bilateral agreements 
between the producing countries and the EU (EU 2007). 
The DRC is currently negotiating a VPA. In practical 
terms, this will involve updating the legislative framework, 
implementing a legality verification system, and establishing 
the traceability of wood at a national scale. As these innova-
tions have significant consequences for the local players, they 
would have to adapt to the process and master new skills. In 
this agreement, the community concessions could be included 
in the form of a forest permit, similar to what has been done 
in Cameroon regarding self-managed community forests. 
This would ensure the legality of the community timber 
production, but verification operations could be difficult to 
perform if the size of community concessions outstrips the 
local capacity of control. 
Many field observations in countries more advanced in the 
FLEGT process have indicated that there is still a long way to 
get the first results. A study (Julve et al. 2013) has tested the 
7
 This programme is designated generally by the acronym FLEGT, short for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade.
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FLEGT “legality grid”8 that the Cameroonian community 
forests will be obliged to follow soon. The grid was tested on 
half of the active community forests in Cameroon to analyse 
the gaps between the activities carried out on the land and 
the legality indicators included in the grid. The results show 
that none of the sampled forests fully complied with the 
requirements of the grid. This study has helped to identify 
the bottlenecks associated with the complex procedures, the 
excessive costs imposed by the current regulations, and the 
lack of electricity and computer facilities in the villages. 
The future concession-holding communities of the DRC 
would undoubtedly have to contend with similar bottlenecks. 
It is likely that the DRC community concession holders 
would sell their products principally to the domestic market. 
In fact, the traceability and verification requirements, essen-
tial for issuing the FLEGT licenses required for exporting 
to the EU, appear to be beyond their technical and financial 
capacity. Moreover, the DRC government seems unable to 
provide the concession holders with the necessary assistance. 
Therefore, it would undoubtedly be more appropriate for the 
DRC to omit this category of community concessions, espe-
cially over large areas, from the scope of the VPA-FLEGT. By 
so doing, these concessions would not constitute a potential 
blocking factor for future FLEGT licenses applied for by the 
industrial exporters. In any case, the DRC government should 
be obliged to decriminalise artisanal logging, i.e., adapt the 
legal and fiscal framework to the constraints facing these 
economic agents, and introduce a process that would facilitate 
the regulation of this subsector. 
CONCLUSION
Although progress on the legal front has not yet led to the 
implementation of the recommended process, the promulga-
tion of Decree 14/018 and Ministerial Order 025 on forest 
concessions for local communities was undoubtedly a posi-
tive development for social forestry in the DRC. Rainforest 
Foundation (2016) estimated that 75 million hectares could 
be allocated in concessions for communities in DRC. This 
creates a considerable challenge for local populations. The 
explicit recognition of the distinction between a customary 
de facto local community forest and a modern legal entity 
(concession), based on customary practices, is genuinely 
innovative. This aspect distinguishes the DRC decree from 
the decrees governing “one-dimensional” community forest-
ry in the other countries of the sub-region. The emphasis on 
joint ownership of the concession for the benefit of the entire 
community (not for an association) aims to avert the risk of 
privatisation by the members of the association. Moreover, 
the proposed governance structures are intended to avert the 
risk of seizure by the elites. However, viewed from the 
perspective of the long-established customs and traditions, 
the question remains whether these measures would be 
sufficient. 
Other interesting factors appear in the decree, such as 
participatory demarcation, the decentralised character, and 
possible forms of social forestry oriented toward non-timber 
valorisation methods, such as remunerated conservation, and 
ecotourism. Selecting a maximum area of 50,000 ha for the 
community concessions, in contrast to the 10,000 ha pro-
posed in the preliminary draft, undoubtedly demonstrated a 
shift in the government policy away from the industrial timber 
exploitation model. This can be related with the fact that 
industrial forestry has been opposed by some of the environ-
mentalist NGOs and has been blamed repeatedly for its poor 
contribution to the GDP of the DRC. Many uncertainties 
remain, however, pertaining to the participation of migrants 
and women, as well as to the potential for degradation related 
to artisanal operations, the unsustainable nature of which in 
the DRC has been demonstrated again recently (Mégevand 
2013). Another reservation is related to illegal industrial 
operations that could possibly benefit from areas that are too 
large to be effectively controlled. 
Finally, a 2015 Order (no. 050 of 23 September 2015) 
raised strong concerns among the advocates of community 
forestry in DRC. This order establishes artisanal concessions 
“in favour of local communities” but to be held and managed 
by the “Decentralised Territorial Entities” (ETDs, the French 
acronym) on the basis of an agreement with local communi-
ties with customary land rights to the area. These new conces-
sions would have a maximum area of 500 ha (without 
mention of the maximum volume of timber to be extracted) 
and timber exploitation could be outsourced. This order 
is seen as creating unfair competition with the potential 
community concessions, since the local governments, which 
could derive financial benefits from these artisanal conces-
sions would have the decision-making authority. ETDs 
encompass local councils, but also chieftaincies and other 
entities, which are recognized as having a legal personality, 
unlike the communities (which have to set up an association 
or a cooperative to exploit the community concession). The 
argument about the legal personality is put forward by the 
advocates of this order. It expresses the rampant opposition 
of those within the Ministry in charge of the forests who are 
opposed to community forestry, as they do not believe in the 
communities’ capacity for sustainable forest management. 
This shows that there is still a long way to go before this 
community forestry model can be implemented in the DRC, 
in spite of (successful) efforts to pass innovative regulations.
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